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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, 2007
Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") policy
change concerning "fleeting expletives," which made Fox Televisions Stations,
Inc. ("Fox") liable for two broadcasts deemed indecent under the new policy,
was an arbitrary and capricious change under the Administrative Procedure
Act.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the FCC's new policy on "fleeting expletives" was arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act, and thus void. Specifically, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that the new policy was a "significant departure" from the
previous policy, and that the FCC had failed to provide a reasonable explana-
tion for this departure from established practices. The court vacated the FCC's
order and remanded the case to the FCC for further proceedings consistent
with the court's order.
History: Congress has authorized the FCC to impose a forfeiture penalty on
any person that broadcasts obscene, indecent, or profane speech over the air-
waves in the United States. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D). However, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act allows courts to set aside any agency's decision
that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
The FCC first tested its forfeiture penalty for the broadcast of indecent
speech in 1975, when it ruled that Pacifica Foundation's broadcast of George
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue was indecent and consequently sanctioned
Pacifica with forfeiture. Pacifica Foundation appealed the ruling to the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which invalidated the decision as too vague
and overbroad. The FCC subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which
ultimately found, in a plurality opinion, that the FCC's regulation of indecent
material was not a violation of the First Amendment; however, the Court nar-
rowed its ruling to the specific facts of the case. See FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 750-751 (1978).
In its subsequent decisions, the FCC followed the Pacifica holding closely
and narrowed its policy of sanctioning indecent broadcasts to only those situa-
tions where the expletives were repeatedly uttered. Then, in 2004, the FCC
changed its position on "fleeting expletives" after the full Commission over-
ruled all prior decisions that had held "fleeting expletives" as not indecent. See
In re Complaints Against Various Broadcasts Licensees Regarding Their Air-
ing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
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der,19 F.C.C.R 4975 (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Golden Globe]. The incident
in question involved the musician Bono's use of a variant of the "F-word" dur-
ing his acceptance speech at the January 19, 2003 Golden Globe Awards. The
full Commission held that the use of the "F-word" was patently offensive, and
that the fleeting and isolated use of the word was irrelevant, thereby com-
pletely disregarding the "fleeting expletive" exemption.
Thereafter, the FCC issued an order in 2006 finding four programs indecent
under the Golden Globe standard of indecency: Fox's broadcasts of the 2002
and 2003 Billboard Music Awards, various episodes of ABC's "NYPD Blue,"
and an incident on CBS's "The Early Show." See In re Complaints Regarding
Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005,
Notice of Apparent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21
F.C.C.R 2664 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order]. Here, the FCC
reiterated that the offending material need not be repeated in order for it to be
found indecent. Although the FCC declined to issue forfeitures because the
broadcasts in question occurred before the Golden Globe decision, all three
networks appealed the decision.
All the appeals were eventually consolidated into the Second Circuit, but be-
fore briefs could be filed the FCC requested a voluntary remand to consider the
networks' arguments. After taking comments, the FCC's new order still found
Fox liable for the incidents occurring during the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Mu-
sic Awards-the FCC exempted ABC from liability on technical grounds and
ruled CBS's violation was in the context of a "bona fide news interview." See
In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February
2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, Order, 21 F.C.C.R 13,299 (Nov. 6, 2006) [herein-
after Remand Order]. An automatic appeal followed, resulting in this opinion.
Discussion: Fox, CBS, and NBC ("the Networks") raised several arguments
against the Remand Order; however, the court only considered the first:
whether the policy applied in the Remand Order was an arbitrary and capri-
cious change to the "fleeting expletives" policy because it was a dramatic
change in policy without explanation. In assessing the case the court looked to
the validity of the "fleeting expletive" policy as a whole rather than the just the
specific broadcasts in question, i.e., the policy of the Golden Globe decision
rather than how it was applied in the Remand Order.
Noting their power to set aside an agency's decision as "arbitrary or capri-
cious," the court looked to see if the FCC had provided a reasonable explana-
tion that would justify the drastic change of policy. In so doing, the court found
that the FCC had in fact changed its policy on "fleeting expletives" with the
Golden Globe decision. As a result of the departure from previous policy, the
FCC was required to give a reasoned analysis for the change from prior prece-
dent, otherwise its decision would be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. See
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N. Y. Council, Ass 'n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757
F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985).
In evaluating the FCC's reasons for the policy change, the court confined its
analysis to the reasons announced by the FCC. First, the court turned to the
FCC's altered "first blow" theory, originally offered by the Supreme Court to
justify the FCC's regulation of broadcasts in Pacifica. Arguing an expanded
view of this theory, the FCC noted that an "automatic exemption for 'isolated
or fleeting' expletives unfairly forces viewers (including children) to take 'the
first blow."' Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R 13,299, 25. In rejecting this conten-
tion, the Second Circuit noted that the FCC does not explain why there was no
"first blow" harm from "fleeting expletives" for the thirty years between
Pacifica and Golden Globe. The court also took issue with the inconsistencies
in the FCC policy, which would allow expletives if they were "integral" to a
program or if they were part of a "bona fide news interview," but not anywhere
else-essentially forcing the public to take a "first blow" in certain contexts,
but not in others. Thus, the court found the "first blow" theory failed to offer a
reasonable explanation necessary to make such a drastic change in policy.
Next the court briefly considered the other theories offered by the FCC, but
found all of them to be insufficient to allow for the drastic change. The court
rejected the view that "non-literal" uses of expletives should fall within the
definition of indecency, which the FCC defined as words describing a sexual
or excretory function or organ, because it lacked common sense. The court
noted that most people understand the "non-literal" usage to have no "sexual or
excretory" meanings. Likewise, the court rejected the FCC's contention that
allowing "fleeting expletives" would cause broadcasters to increase the airing
of expletives because they could do so with impunity by airing them one at a
time. This rejection was based upon the FCC's own brief, which indicated that
broadcasters never filled the airwaves with expletives prior to the Golden
Globe decision. See Remand Order, 29. Finally, the court rejected the claim
that the emphasis of enforcement on the context of the speech was not consis-
tent with the policy of "fleeting expletives." The court reasoned that emphasiz-
ing context was inconsistent with the FCC's policy of treating variants of cer-
tain expletives as presumptively indecent (essentially, not allowing context to
play a role, which was what the FCC was saying made "fleeting expletives"
inconsistent). Also, the court stated that the FCC failed to explain why an iso-
lated expletive should now fit under the indecency test. Because the FCC of-
fered no reasonable explanations for the change in policy, the court held that
the policy was "arbitrary and capricious" and thus void under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
Dissent: Justice Leval dissented from the majority opinion, believing that
the FCC gave reasonable explanations for their change in policy and that the
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court should not impose its own judgment when an agency has given sufficient
accounting. While agreeing that the reasons were not compelling, Justice Leval
thought the reasons were still enough to satisfy the Supreme Court's require-
ment of reasonable explanation, and thus should receive deference by the
court.
Summarized by Patrick Dupre
Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, No. 05-4769, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
24,204 (3d Cir. 2007)
Issue: Whether the FCC appropriately classified Digital Subscriber Line
("DSL") as an "information service" rather than a "telecommunications ser-
vice," thereby exempting DSL service from Title II of the Communications
Act of 1934, which requires common carriers to provide unfettered access to
competing service providers.
Holding: The FCC maintained and exercised the appropriate authority in de-
termining that DSL should be classified as an "information service," and there-
fore, the companies providing the service are not subject to Title II require-
ments.
History: The Supreme Court considered the ability of the FCC to interpret
the definitions of telecommunication and information services in National Ca-
ble & Telecommunication Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S.
967 (2005). In Brand X, the Court held that the FCC appropriately concluded
that broadband Internet access provided by cable companies was an "informa-
tion service," because the classification was based upon the end-users percep-
tion of the service as an information service. The Communications Act defines
an "information service" as a service that modifies data and information be-
tween the creator and the end-user; whereas, the Act defines telecommunica-
tion services as a link between two users without any modification of the data.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) & (46).
In 1971, the FCC implemented the Regulatory and Policy Problems Pre-
sented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and
Facilities ("Computer 1"). 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971). Computer I required local
telephone companies (termed Local Exchange Carries, "LECs") that sell data
services, to form completely separate subsidiaries for data services. Specifi-
cally, the companies' roles as telecommunication providers and data service
providers should not commingle. Computer I also determined there was less
need to regulate data service than telecommunication service. These data ser-
vices continued to develop and expand over the course of the decade.
In 1980, the FCC significantly amended its regulations related to the trans-
mission of data. This section of the code was known as "Computer II." Com-
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mission's Rules and Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980). This ruling relaxed
the data service provider separation requirement and split data transmission
into two categories: (1) basic transmission service, consisting of the movement
of data in an unaltered form; and (2) enhanced transmission service, consisting
of anything more than basic transmission. The FCC further explained enhanced
data services as any modification of content or manipulation of information by
either the vendor or the user. The categorization of data determined the appli-
cability of Title 11. Basic service was subject to Title II, but enhanced service
was not. Enhanced services need basic services to function. Providers of basic
services were therefore required, as LECs, to provide non-discriminatory ac-
cess to enhanced service providers. Thus, data transmission became subject to
FCC regulation.
Congress amended Title II in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. With the goal of enhancing competition, the Act
imposed additional duties on LECs, such as prohibiting unreasonably strict
resale of their services and permitting competitors to access their rights of way.
47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1) & (4). The Act also essentially reclassified basic data
services and enhanced data services as "telecommunications service" and "in-
formation service," respectively. This change had relatively little effect until
2002.
Prodded by technological advancements, the FCC ruled that broadband
Internet service provided by a cable company was an "information service"
and not subject to Title II regulation. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002). This
ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court in Brand X. Shortly thereafter, the
FCC, in its Wireline Broadband Order, ruled similarly that DSL service was
an integrated "information service," rather than an "information and telecom-
munication service." Therefore, LECs were no longer required to grant non-
discriminatory line access to independent Internet service providers ("ISPs").
Discussion: Several ISPs challenged the FCC's interpretation of "informa-
tion service" under the Telecommunications Act. However, the Third Circuit
found that BrandX controlled.
The petitioners in Time Warner argued that the FCC's determination that
DSL is an information service was not supported by record evidence, was con-
trary to the agency's prior rulings and was inconsistent with broadband's
treatment under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA"). The court quickly dismissed these arguments. In considering the
lack of record evidence, the court looked to the FCC's Wireline Broadband
Ruling and noted that the FCC found that end-users view DSL service and
cable Internet service as equivalent. The court found this sufficient, especially
considering the FCC's previous ruling that the definition of an offering turned
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on end-users' perceptions of the service. As for contradictory prior treatment
of DSL service by the agency, the court identified that the FCC candidly ad-
mitted it had not been completely consistent with its treatment of wireline
broadband. Even so, the court deferred to the Supreme Court's BrandX ruling,
which stated that the initial determination of a definition was not "carved in
stone" and can be reevaluated based on technological developments. Thus,
inconsistent treatment of the definition alone does not make the interpretation
unlawful. Thirdly, the petitioners argued that because the FCC interpreted
CALEA to pertain to "pure telecommunications providers," "pure information
services" and "hybrid telecommunications-information services," the FCC,
arbitrarily and capriciously interpreted "information service" to be mutually
exclusive of "telecommunications service." However, the court held that the
agency had the right to interpret the two statutes differently as they serve dif-
ferent legislative purposes.
The petitioners also asserted that the elimination of non-discriminatory ac-
cess to LEC lines under Title II was itself arbitrary and capricious, and fur-
thermore, that such a decision violated requirements of section 214 of the
Communications Act and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Their
first argument centered on the elimination of the Computer 11 requirements,
which required that LECs provide non-discriminatory access to competitors.
The petitioners contended that before the FCC could eliminate the require-
ments, the agency must conduct a full market analysis. However, the court held
that precedent only requires a "reasoned analysis" especially in light of the
rapidly changing market. The FCC provided such a reasoned analysis in the
Wireline Broadband Order by considering how the broadband market is likely
to develop. The court agreed that a forward-looking analysis was appropriate
in this situation.
Under the second claim, the petitioners argued that after eliminating Com-
puter II, the FCC should have evaluated LEC service under the common car-
rier test set forth in National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir 1976). This test mandates that the agency
regulate a carrier as a common carrier if the public interest so requires. Con-
trary to the claim, the court held that the FCC had evaluated the public interest
and had determined that regulation under Computer 11 would harm consumers
by impeding development of innovative technologies. The FCC also concluded
that independent ISPs would continue to have access to the lines because LECs
would be motivated to spread the cost of their network to as many customers
as possible. Because the FCC did take the public interest into consideration,




Finally, the court turned to the alleged violation of section 214 of the Com-
munications Act and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Section 214
requires common carriers to obtain a certificate of discontinuance prior to
eliminating a service. The FCC, in redefining DSL service, effectively issued a
blanket certificate of discontinuance. The petitioners argued that the FCC may
not issue a blanket certificate. The court rejected this argument for lack of any
supporting precedent. Additionally, the court further dispelled the argument by
noting that the only requirement under section 214 is an opportunity to be
heard, which the FCC provided through the one-year transition period preserv-
ing the right of the agency to take action if necessary to preserve the public
interest. Failing to find any violation of section 214 or the Due Process Clause,
the court denied the petition for review.
Summarized by Robert M Bankey, Jr.
Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones
Telecommunications, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007)
Issue: (1) Whether the FCC's application of §§ 201(b) and 207, which au-
thorize the FCC to declare any carrier charge, regulation, or practice "unjust or
unreasonable," is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes; and (2) whether §
207 authorizes a payphone operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit against a
recalcitrant carrier that refuses to pay the compensation that the Commission's
order says it owes.
Holding: The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Breyer, held that a
federal-court cause of action is available to rectify injuries caused by violations
of the Communications Act's "just and reasonable" section implemented by
FCC regulation. The Court further held that the FCC acted lawfully when it
determined that the long distance carrier's failure to pay compensation was
either an "unjust or unreasonable" practice within meaning of the Communica-
tions Act. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Roberts, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito joined.
Justices Thomas and Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.
History: A payphone operator sued a long-distance carrier to recover com-
pensation for dial-around coinless calls authorized by the Communications Act
and Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regulations. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the car-
rier's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that a private cause of ac-
tion was available for a long-distance carrier's failure to pay the service pro-
vider its dial-around compensation. The United States Court of Appeals for the




Discussion: The FCC regulates interstate telephone communications under a
regulatory scheme that is similar to the Interstate Commerce Act, via the
Communications Act of 1934, which granted the FCC broad authority to regu-
late interstate telephone communications. Congress borrowed directly from the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 when it drafted the Communications Act. In
both the Interstate Commerce and Communication Acts, the statutory provi-
sions authorize the Commission to declare any carrier "charge," "regulation,"
or "practice" in connection with the carrier's services to be "unjust or unrea-
sonable," thereby authorizing an injured person to recover
Legislation passed by Congress in 1990 to help bolster competition required
payphone operators to provide free access to payphone users to connect to the
long-distance carrier of their choice. This legislation required payphone opera-
tors to allow the user to obtain "free" access to the carrier, i.e. by making a
coinless call. Since Congress also recognized that the "free" call would cost the
payphone operator, it required the FCC to "prescribe regulations that... estab-
lish a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone service providers
are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and interstate
call." 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A).
At issue in this case is Global Crossing's failure to pay the payphone opera-
tor, Metrophones Telecommunications. The statutory language of sections
§201(b) and §207, taken with the history as originally implemented in the In-
terstate Commerce Act, shows that the purpose of §207 is to allow persons
injured by a §201(b) violation to bring a federal-court action. Thus, a violation
of a regulation that lawfully implements §201(b) is a violation of the statute.
Global Crossing refused to pay a Commission-ordered compensation to
Metrophones, even though it had a received a benefit from Metrophones.
Metrophones allowed coinless calls to be placed through its phones, and
Global Crossing benefited from those calls.
The FCC determined, through its regulations, that the cost of such coinless
calls should be bom in this manner by the long distance provider. This deter-
mination by the FCC is within its statutory authority. Global Crossing violated
the FCC's decision that the coinless calls should be made and then compen-
sated for by the long distance carrier. The cause of action was properly brought
in federal court.
Summarized by Leigh Bothe
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